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Brandenburg: You're the Problem, Officer

YOU’RE THE PROBLEM, OFFICER: WHETHER EXECUTIVE
OFFICERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO THE SAME STANDARDS
OF LIABILITY AS DIRECTORS UNDER CURRENT CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE LAW
Margo Brandenburg

I. INTRODUCTION
Many recent corporate scandals involved executive officers’ improper
behavior. In the past twenty years, big names like Disney,1 Enron,2 and
Nissan3 have all experienced officer misconduct at the expense of the
corporation. In one notably outrageous example, Disney awarded its
newly appointed executive officer Michael Orvitz more than $38 million
in cash, plus $3 million in stock options to leave the position, even after
he proved utterly incapable of performing the duties required and was
completely disinterested in the position itself.4 Orvitz must have finally
begun to believe in the “magic” of Disney on that payday, to be sure.
Executive officer misconduct can lead to public humiliation, client
loss, federal investigations, and shareholder distrust.5 As one leading
corporate governance scholar stated, “the single major challenge
addressed by corporate governance is how to grant managers enormous
discretionary power over the conduct of business while holding them

1. See David Teather, Disney’s Shareholders Force Eisner out of Chairman’s Role, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2004), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2004/mar/04/usnews.citynews.
2. See Troy Segal, Enron Scandal: The Fall of the Wall Street Darling, INVESTOPEDIA (May 29,
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/updates/enron-scandal-summary/. Enron executives lead the
company in using mark-to-market accounting procedures to hide unprofitable activities and defraud
shareholders, who were led to believe the company was more profitable than it truly was. Id. As a result,
several Enron executives were charged with securities fraud, conspiracy, and insider trading. Id.
3. See Michael Wayland, Scandal at Nissan deepens as CEO Saikawa resigns after admitting he
was improperly overpaid, CNBC (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/09/nissan-ceo-saikawato-step-down-on-september-16.html. Nissan executives falsified financial documents, concealing more
than $327 million in fraudulent payments to themselves. Id.
4. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).This case explains
that Michael Eisner, Disney’s CEO (and notably Orvitz’s good friend of over twenty-five years), allowed
Orvitz to begin serving as Disney’s President even before Disney executed his employment contract. Id.
at 281. During his time in the position, Orvitz stated on Larry King Live that he knew about 1% of what
he needed to know in order to fulfill his job’s duties. Id. at 283. In addition, Vanity Fair published an
article explaining that Orvitz cancelled all meetings with Disney’s’ chief financial officer to learn more
about his position, stating that Orvitz "didn't understand the duties of an executive at a public company[,]
and he didn't want to learn." Id. Not to mention, instead of working on improving in his position at Disney,
he had already begun seeking employment elsewhere before he was even asked to leave. Id.
5. David Larcker & Brian Tayan, We Studied 38 Incidents of CEO Bad Behavior and Measured
Their Consequences, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 9, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/06/we-studied-38-incidentsof-ceo-bad-behavior-and-measured-their-consequences.

710

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 5

2021]

YOU’RE THE PROBLEM, OFFICER

711

accountable for the use of that power.”6 Today’s business world is
surrounded by nonstop media coverage, so an executive officer’s
reputation undeniably matters to a corporation’s success and is one of its
most valuable assets.7
The consequences are real when a company’s executive officer
misbehaves. Thus, there is a need for authority in determining how a court
is supposed to act when an executive officer blunders while performing
their duties. Must a court intervene and punish the officer? Or should a
court give deference to the officer’s decision, knowing that hindsight
judgment is never a proper way to analyze a business choice? Despite the
ever-increasing need for legal authority regarding officers, there is
surprisingly very little case law discussing the liability standards of these
executives.8
Consistent instruction relating to officer liability and responsibility has
“remained under the legal radar,” and today there is still no concrete
answer.9 As such, this Comment will examine the duties and liabilities of
both corporate directors and officers, and address whether, given the
current corporate governance landscape, officers should receive the
deference and protections that directors have. Part II of the Comment will
discuss the governing law, the duties of directors and officers, and the
discrepancies between them in terms of the business judgment rule and
other exculpatory protections. Part III of this Comment will discuss the
rationales behind the business judgment rule and exculpatory protections
and opine about how the discrepancies in officer and director liability
should be resolved. Part IV will conclude by noting that this dearth of
officer case law should be given more attention, and that officers should
be afforded the same protections as corporate directors.
II. BACKGROUND
This Section will proceed by giving a brief overview of Delaware law
and its importance in study of corporate law. Next, this Section will
discuss the fiduciary duties that officers and directors owe to corporations
under Delaware law. Finally, this Section will outline the discrepancies
between the protections that Delaware law affords officers and directors
by virtue of their positions.

6. Paul Graf, A Realistic Approach to Officer Liability, 66 BUS. LAW. 315 (2011).
7. The
Importance
of
a
Business
Executive’s
Reputation,
WASH.
ST.
U.,https://onlinemba.wsu.edu/blog/the-importance-of-a-business-executives-reputation/ (last visited Apr.
14, 2020).
8. 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS § 1.15 (2019).
9. Id.
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A. Delaware Law
State law generally governs the internal affairs of a corporation.10 Since
the early 1900s, Delaware has been the most influential state in regulating
the formation and management of corporations. 11 Sixty-five percent of
Fortune 500 companies and more than fifty percent of all publicly traded
companies in the United States are incorporated in Delaware.12 Such a
large percentage of corporations choose to incorporate in Delaware
because its law provides both the stability and flexibility for a corporation
to govern its own affairs with minimal judicial encroachment.13
The Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) governs Delaware
corporate law issues.14 The DGCL “helps entrepreneurs, corporate
managers, and stockholders create wealth through the corporate form.” 15
The law governs the internal affairs of the corporation and the relationship
between the company’s owners (stockholders) and managers (the
directors and officers).16 Partisan divides when making amendments to
the DGCL are virtually unheard of because the political parties
understand that trillions of dollars are invested in corporations and they
recognize the importance of ensuring that all stakeholders can rely on the
DGCL for integrity and efficiency.17
The Delaware Court of Chancery is tasked with interpreting the statutes
within the DGCL.18 This court is widely recognized as having a
specialized focus in dealing with corporate law issues.19 The court’s
ability to parse out complex corporate law issues is unparalleled by any
other court in the United States.20 Rather than having one judge and a
panel of jury members, the court is comprised of five chancellors who are
10. About
Delaware’s
Corporation
Law,
DELAWARE.GOV,
https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delawares-general-corporation-law/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
11. Why Businesses Choose Delaware, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/whybusinesses-choose-delaware/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
12. Why Delaware Corporate Law Matters So Much, DELAWARE INC.COM (July 24, 2017),
https://www.delawareinc.com/blog/why-delaware-corporate-law-matters-so-much/.
13. See About Delaware’s Corporation Law, supra note 10. To attest to Delaware law’s stability,
“Delaware’s constitution requires a super-majority vote by the legislature to amend the corporation law,
protecting the DGCL from one-time amendments proposed by special-interest groups or influential
corporations.” Id.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Court of Chancery, DELAWARE COURTS, https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/ (last
visited Feb. 18, 2020).
18. See Litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court,
DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delaware-court-chancery-supreme-court/ (last visited
Aug. 27, 2020).
19. About Delaware’s Corporation Law, supra note 10.
20. Id.
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appointed by the Governor, subject to the advice and consent of the
Senate.21 All appeals from the Court of Chancery go directly to the
Delaware Supreme Court, which is composed of five justices who have
specialized experience dealing with corporate law disputes.22
With specialized judges weighing legal arguments and ultimately
deciding corporate law disputes, the Delaware courts are known to
produce well-reasoned and thoughtfully articulated decisions.23 This
approach serves to create a large archive of case law that corporations
may look to for guidance on a particular corporate law dispute.24
Interestingly, while Delaware courts have the largest collection of
information on corporate governance in the country, neither Delaware
statutes nor case law delves deep into the responsibilities of arguably the
most important actors in corporate affairs: a company’s executive
officers.25 In fact, judicial and legislative directives on this front are quite
sparse.26 In contrast, Delaware law contains a large amount of directives
regarding director responsibilities, and the guidance is continually
increasing over time.27
B. Fiduciary Duties of Directors
A corporation’s board of directors plays a critical role in the managing of its
internal affairs: it has the power to make every high-level business decision for the
corporation.28 However, when using this power, directors must comply with the
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation.29 The duty of care requires a director
to stay informed about developments in the corporation in order to make wise

21. Litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, supra note
18.
22. Id.
23. About Delaware’s Corporation Law, supra note 10.
24. Id.
25. Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Long Silence on Corporate Officers, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(MAY 23, 2017) https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/05/23/delawares-long-silence-on-corporateofficers/. “When comparing an officer next to a director, the director is the person who takes part in
managing important business affairs, while officers oversee daily aspects of the business.” Officer vs
Director: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL,
https://www.upcounsel.com/officer-vs-director (last visited Apr. 11, 2020).
26. This sparseness is explained in part by the fact that the Delaware Court of Chancery did not
have personal jurisdiction over an individual solely because he served as an officer of a corporation until
2004. Michael Follett, Note, Gantler v. Stephens: Big Epiphany or Big Failure? A Look at the Current
State of Officers' Fiduciary Duties and Advice for Potential Protection, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 565
(2010). Additionally, boards of directors usually deal with officer misconduct by contract, rather than
through the judicial system. Johnson, supra note 25.
27. Johnson, supra note 25.
28. Powers & Duties of Corporation Directors & Officers, WOLTERS KLUWER (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://ct.wolterskluwer.com/resource-center/articles/powers-and-duties-of-corporate-directors-officers.
29. Id.
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business decisions.30A director’s duty of loyalty requires a director to act in the
best interests of the corporation at all times, rather than advance their own selfinterest.31 The Delaware Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the duties of care
and loyalty are the only duties that directors owe to the corporation.32 However,
some circumstances require special applications of the duties of care and loyalty,
such as the duties of candor or disclosure (the “Revlon duties”).33 Revlon duties
require that a corporate board perform its fiduciary duties in a manner that
maximizes the sale price of the enterprise.34 A director’s duty of candor or
disclosure rests on the proposition that directors “fully and fairly” disclose all
material information to shareholders in order to elicit shareholder action within the
corporation.35 A breach of these duties on the part of a director is determined by a
standard of gross negligence.36

C. Fiduciary Duties of Officers
1. Corporate Officers Generally
When directors make decisions regarding the corporation, the officers
are tasked with executing those decisions.37 The duties of a corporation’s
officers are set forth in the bylaws of the corporation, or are decided by
the directors pursuant to guidelines in the bylaws.38 In addition to duties
of care and loyalty, officers owe additional duties of good conduct, a duty
to provide information and assist directors in understanding reported
information, and a duty to obey the principal, among others.39
While executive officers are tasked with being the loyal servants of the
corporation, this is not the reality for many corporations in the United
States today. In addition to planning for the overall success of the
corporation, the chief executive officer (“CEO”) is tasked with leading

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 n.400 (Del. Ch. 2005).
33. Id.
34. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001). In Revlon, the court found that where
directors allow considerations other than maximizing shareholder profit affect their decision making,
directors do not act in shareholders’ best interests and thus amounts to a breach of the business judgment
rule. Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
35. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992).
36. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling why Corporate Officers are Fiduciaries, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1631 (2005). Gross negligence is defined as an “amplification” of ordinary
negligence, going beyond basic carelessness to include reckless or willful misconduct of a person. Richard
Stim, Claims of Gross Negligence, ALLLAW, https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personalinjury/claims-gross-negligence.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
37. Powers & Duties of Corporation Directors & Officers, supra note 28.
38. Id.
39. Johnson & Millon, supra note 36, at 1630-31.
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the development and execution of long-term goals to maximize
shareholder wealth.40 Executive officers have been known to lead their
companies "like corporate emperors and empresses,” exerting power over
other managers, directors, and even shareholders, who in their job
description they are tasked with serving.41 To attest to this officer
dominance, one scholar compared the CEO of a corporation to the
President of the United States, deeming those occupations two of the most
intriguing and influential positions in law and society to date.42
Executive officers wield considerable power. When an officer uses that
power but makes mistakes along the way, it raises the question of whether
and how to hold them liable. The inquiry of whether officers should be
treated the same as directors in terms of liability gets more complex when
individuals hold dual positions as executive officers and directors. Over
half of the companies in the S&P 500 Index have CEOs who
contemporaneously hold the position of chairman of the board of
directors.43 The CEO is the primary operational decision-maker at the
company, while the chairman of the board is responsible for protecting
the investors’ interests and overseeing the corporation in its entirety.44
The chairman of the board is tasked with being the “boss” of the
corporation and is not typically involved with the day-to-day operations
of the business, allowing the CEO to run the corporation in a manner of
their choosing.45
2. Gantler v. Stephens:46 A Semi-Saving Grace for Officer
Responsibilities
Before 2009, there was no concrete answer of what fiduciary duties
executive officers owed under Delaware law. A conclusive answer did
not come into fruition until the Delaware Supreme Court issued its
opinion n Gantler v. Stephens.47 In Gantler, shareholders of a corporation
alleged that a group of the corporation’s directors and officers violated

40. What
is
a
CEO
(Chief
Executive
Officer)?,
CFI,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/careers/jobs/what-is-a-ceo-chief-executive-officer/ (last
visited Feb. 22, 2020).
41. Tom C.W. Lin, CEOs and Presidents, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1351, 1364 (2014).
42. Id.
43. David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Chairman and CEO: The Controversy over Board
Leadership,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(July
26,
2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/26/chairman-and-ceo-the-controversy-over-board-leadership/.
44. What is a CEO (Chief Executive Officer)?, supra note 40.
45. Id.
46. 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
47. Id.
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their fiduciary duties.48 The shareholders supported their allegations by
explaining that the directors and officers refused to sell the corporation
and, in turn, benefitted themselves by merely reclassifying shares and
releasing a misleading proxy statement to induce shareholder approval. 49
In deciding the fiduciary breach question, the court first addressed
whether both officers and directors owe identical fiduciary duties to the
corporations they serve.50 The court, noting this question as being a matter
of first impression, answered affirmatively. 51 However, the court failed to
mention whether officers should be given the benefit of the business
judgment rule and whether they would be held to a standard of simple
negligence as agents of the corporation or a lesser standard of gross
negligence like directors.52
3. Executive Officers Expanding their Reach: Increased use of
Technology and The Business Roundtable Statement on the Purpose of a
Corporation
Executive officers constantly look to make corporate governance
decisions that maximize the long-term value of the corporations they
serve. Two ways executive officers have generally attempted to keep up
with the ever-changing business world in modern times are the increased
use of social media and electronic news outlets, and an enlarged focus on
the stakeholders of the corporation through the issuance of the Business
Roundtable’s Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation.53
In the digital age, executive officers are under an increased
microscope.54 Because they are the faces of their companies, the way
officers are perceived by stakeholders affects both public opinion and
profitability of the corporation overall.55 Thus, officers’ individual careers
and the corporation’s profitability rests upon the extent to which they
mitigate reputational risks and negative public perception. 56 However,
reputation management proves to be increasingly difficult. In these days
of round-the-clock access to sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Yelp,
executive officers—particularly CEOs—must work to guard and manage

48. Id.
49. Id. at 698.
50. Id. at 708-09.
51. Id.
52. Follett, supra note 26, at 575.
53. Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-topromote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
54. The Importance of a Business Executive’s Reputation, supra note 7.
55. See id.
56. Id.
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their reputations more than ever before in history.57
Today, a CEO’s reputation may extend to activities that are beyond the
corporation, and its products or services, in a practice known as CEO
activism.58 CEO activism occurs when corporate leaders take public
stances on controversial political and social issues—topics that have not
traditionally been spoken of in the business world.59 While some CEOs
claim they engage in activism out of personal conviction, others have
stated that their speaking out contributes to a higher sense of corporate
purpose, which is vital in modern society.60 This extension of the purpose
of the corporation—to one that is responsible in social and political
spheres, as well as economic,—is of great importance to millennials, who
are beginning to dominate the markets as customers, employees, and
shareholders.61
The rise of CEO activism has incited formal statements from some top
corporations committing to serve a purpose higher than merely creating
shareholder value. While CEOs are tasked with running the corporation’s
day-to-day activities, generating profits, and returning value to the
shareholders, some have chosen to formally broaden the scope of their
duties. In 2019, the Business Roundtable, composed of 188 CEOs of
major U.S. corporations, redefined the duties of a corporation in its
Statement on the Purpose of the Corporation.62 The statement, signed by
181 of the Roundtable’s members, outlined a modern standard for
corporate governance that pledges each CEO’s support of each
corporation’s stakeholders, rather than just their shareholders.63 It
highlights that corporations should work to deliver value to customers,
invest in employees, deal fairly with suppliers, and support local
communities, all alongside the traditional duty to maximize shareholder
wealth.64

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Aaron K. Chatterji & Michael W. Toffel, The New CEO Activists, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.
2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/the-new-ceo-activists.
60. Id.
61. Id. Millennials tend to put significantly more weight on the social responsibility of
corporations when making decisions on where to work and make purchases than the generation before
them. See Ryan Rudominer, Corporate Social Responsibility Matters: Ignore Millennials At Your Peril,
CENTER OF SOCIAL IMPACT COMM., https://csic.georgetown.edu/magazine/corporate-socialresponsibility-matters-ignore-millennials-peril/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2020). Millennials currently account
for $1 trillion of U.S. consumer spending. Id. Businesses that ignore the higher sense of corporate purpose
do so at their peril. Id.
62. David Benoit, Move Over, Shareholder: Top CEOS Say Companies Have Obligations to
Society, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2019, 6:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/business-roundtable-stepsback-from-milton-friedman-theory-11566205200.
63. Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 53.
64. Id.
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D. Protections Given to Directors that are not Definitively Afforded to
Officers
Both directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporations
they serve.65 This raises the question of whether it is proper to have a
uniform approach in holding them liable for their breaches of those duties.
Today, directors are afforded more definitive protections in their decision
making. Delaware law provides that directors are to be afforded the
presumption of the business judgment rule and other exculpatory
protections. But these protections are not consistently or uniformly
applied to officers. Where these protections are applied, courts provide
sparse reasoning for their applications of the protections and to what
extent they may apply in other instances.
1. Business Judgment Rule
i. Policies Behind the Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule provides that courts, when determining
director liability, should not examine the quality of a director’s business
decisions, but only the procedures used in reaching those decisions.66 The
business judgment rule is “a presumption that, in making a business
decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.”67 The rule is a defense that can reduce the
liability exposure of directors to claims for mismanagement and breach
of their duty of care.68
Without subjecting officers to the more deferential business judgment
rule, they would be held to a standard of simple negligence. For example,
if an officer could have purchased a large piece of equipment at a cheaper
price from an international retailer rather than domestic, then they could
be deemed liable under a simple negligence standard.69 Or, if an officer
failed to take into consideration input from an employee that would have
prevented losses to the corporation, the officer could be held liable for
their failure to consult the employee. 70 In both of those scenarios, the

65. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009).
66. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 8, § 2.01. The business judgment rule is not a substantive rule
of law, but it is a presumption given to directors in their decision-making process. In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 758 (Del. Ch. 2005).
67. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 8, § 2.01.
68. Id.
69. Graf, supra note 6.
70. Id.
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officers could arguably be deemed negligent even though these types of
mistakes occur frequently in the business world.71
The business judgment rule seeks to protect and promote the role of the
board of directors as the ultimate manager of the corporation.72 Thus, the
rule serves to protect directors who made business decisions diligently,
carefully, and who have not acted fraudulently, illegally, or in bad faith.73
The rule is supported by three general policy rationales: (1) encouraging
director risk-taking, (2) avoiding judicial encroachment into business
decisions, and (3) ensuring the board’s role as the central decision-maker
of the corporation.”74
With the added backing of a diversified portfolio, many shareholders
prefer corporate directors to take more risks in their business decisions,
hoping that the decisions lead to a higher payout for them.75 The directors
themselves, who may hold relatively small portions of the whole
corporation’s stock, many times may not see the payoffs from their risktaking measures.76 Thus, the tension emerges of directors wanting to be
risk-averse in order to keep the corporation on the straight-and-narrow,
while shareholders advocate for the corporation to take risks to maximize
profit. The business judgment rule seeks to resolve this issue by allowing
directors to ease their apprehensions of making risky decisions that, in
hindsight, may prove to be imprudent.77
Directors already face informal sanctions for bad decisions, including
unhappy shareholders who may vote them out of office or a decline of the
corporation’s value.78 Judges do not stand to gain or lose in the same
capacity as directors, and so the board should be afforded deference to
make decisions without judicial interference. 79
The DGCL states that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation
. . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”80
The business judgment rule preserves the corporate governance scheme
that was envisioned by the Delaware legislature. 81 Deference to director
decisions, rather than judicial interference in the decision-making of
directors, assists in preserving the authority of the board of directors in
71.
72.
73.
74.
(2005).
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 2005).
KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 8, § 2.01.
Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
Johnson, supra note 74.
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the internal affairs of the corporation, rather than passing the authority to
shareholders or judges who are unfamiliar with the business.82 This
means that directors, upon learning about a fiduciary wrongdoing of a
corporate officer, must investigate the alleged wrong and then decide
whether to pursue a claim by means of litigation, settlement, or intra-firm
sanction.83
ii. Court Confusion Surrounding the Rule
During In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,84 the court explained
that “even where decision-makers act as faithful servants . . . their ability
and the wisdom of their judgments will vary.”85 The court also noted that
“the redress for failures that arise from faithful management must come
from the markets, through the action of shareholders and the free flow of
capital, and not from . . . Court[s].”86 In sum, the business judgment rule
is supported by three general policy rationales: (1) encouraging director
risk-taking measures, (2) avoiding judicial encroachment into business
decisions, and (3) ensuring the board’s role as the central decision-maker
of the corporation.”87
While the business judgment rule certainly applies to directors’
decision-making, the business judgment rule has not found uniform
acceptance in its application to officers of a corporation. In Gantler, the
court assessed the defendant directors’ and officers’ conduct under some
application of the business judgment rule. 88 First, the court directed that
on a motion to dismiss, the pled facts must support a reasonable inference
that the board of directors breached either its duty of loyalty or its duty of
care.89 After assessing the defendant directors’ alleged breaches of
fiduciary duties, the court proceeded to look at whether the officers
breached their fiduciary duties. 90 The court concluded that because the
officers never responded to a due diligence request, there could be a
reasonable inference that they breached their duties as officers of the
corporation.91 While not explicitly mentioning that the business judgment
rule also applied to officers, the court implicitly applied the rule by
determining that the officers acted in gross negligence of their duties.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Johnson, supra note 74.
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 696,705-06 (Del. 2009).
Id. at 706.
Id. at 709.
Id.
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The Third Circuit also addressed the business judgment rule’s
application to officers, but its reasoning was vague. In the case of In Re
Tower Air, Inc., the court partly affirmed the holding of a Delaware
District Court and applied the business judgment rule to a decision made
by corporate officers.92 The court confusingly and interchangeably talked
about the business judgment rule’s application to directors only and to
directors and officers together, without distinguishing between the two
groups.93 The Third Circuit offered no discussion of its analytical
approach in determining that the business judgment rule indeed applied
to officers in the same capacity as it did directors.94
Other Delaware courts have made a blanket statement that includes
officers in the definition of those who are protected by the business
judgment rule.95 However, in more recent Delaware cases, courts have
acknowledged the controversy of whether the business judgment rule
applies to officers.96 For example, in a 2016 case, Amalgamated Bank v.
Yahoo! Inc., the court noted that a “vibrant debate” exists whether officers
should be liable for simple negligence, like agents generally, or whether
some other deferential standard of review, such as the business judgment
rule, should apply.97 In addition, during In re Xura, Inc. Stockholder
Litig., a 2018 Delaware Chancery Court opinion, the Vice Chancellor
qualified his presumption that the business judgment rule applied to
officers in a footnote of the opinion. 98 He noted that “in deciding this
motion, I have presumed . . . that the business judgment rule applies to
[the defendant] as CEO. . . this point is not settled in our law and . . . there
is a lively debate among members of the academy regarding whether
corporate officers may avail themselves of business judgment rule
protection.”99
One court has refused to apply the business judgment rule to officers
altogether. In Palmer v. Reali,100 a Delaware District Court did not
address whether the business judgment rule applied to officers of a
corporation because the parties did not cite any Delaware cases where the

92. 416 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005).
93. Id. at 238-39.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 737 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2016),
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907
A.2d 693, 777 n.588 (Del. Ch. 2005).
96. See, e.g., Palmer v. Reali, 211 F. Supp. 3d 655, 666 n.8 (D. Del. 2016); Amalgamated Bank v.
Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 781 n.24 (Del. Ch. 2016).
97. Amalgamated Bank, 132 A.3d at 781 n.24.
98. No. 12698-VCS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 563, at *27 n.113 (Ch. Dec. 10, 2018).
99. Id.
100. 211 F. Supp. 3d at 666 n.8.
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courts applied the business judgment rule to corporate officers.101
Model lawmaking bodies have realized the contours of determining
executive officer liability and have drafted laws that support their stance.
The Model Business Corporation Act states that non-director officers
holding discretionary authority must discharge their duties with the same
standards of care imposed upon directors. 102 In addition, the American
Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations treats the duties of directors and officers alike. It notes
that the law is rather well-settled that officers are held to the same duty of
care and business judgment standards as directors.103 However, in a
comment to the Model Business Corporation Act, the drafters suggested
that an officer’s access to more corporate information than directors may
potentially subject them to higher standards of scrutiny.104
Evidently, current case law falls short of giving reasoned arguments in
deciding to apply or not apply the business judgment rule to officers.
Overall, case law and other legal materials indicate that courts still do not
apply the business judgment rule to officers in the same definitive and
broad fashion that they apply it to directors.
2. Exculpatory Protections
While both directors and officers have identical fiduciary duties, the
consequences for a breach of those duties may not be the same. 105 The
Delaware Supreme Court decided in Smith v. Van Gorkom106 that
directors of a corporation were grossly negligent in failing to inform
themselves of the material facts surrounding a merger, and thus were
personally liable for damages to shareholders. 107 As a result, critics began
predicting that the decision would lead talented board members to step
down out of fear of being held personally liable for decisions made in
good faith.108 The Van Gorkom decision received significant negative
attention, prompting the Delaware legislature to create § 102(b)(7) of the
DGCL.109
Under DGCL § 102(b)(7), a corporation’s certificate of incorporation
may include a provision that limits or fully eliminates the personal

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42 cmt.
KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 8.
Graf, supra note 6.
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 696,709 n.37 (Del. 2009).
488 A.2d 858, 884 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 893.
Graf, supra note 6.
Follett, supra note 26.
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liability of a corporate director or its shareholders for breach of a
fiduciary duty.110 Most Delaware corporations have exculpation
provisions within their certificate of incorporation, to the extent that §
102(b)(7) provides for them to be used.111 The purpose of DGCL §
102(b)(7) is “to encourage directors to undertake risky, but potentially
value-maximizing, business strategies, so long as they do so in good
faith.”112
While, as the Gantler court noted, a similar provision is “legislatively
possible” with respect to corporate officers, there is currently no section
within the DGCL that allows for the creation of exculpation provisions
for corporate officers.113 Thus, unless the Delaware legislature creates
such a provision, the finding of a fiduciary breach will likely not be the
same for both directors and officers, and could hinge entirely on the
position that an individual holds. For example, even if a director and an
officer of the same corporation are found to have committed the same
form of misconduct, the director could be shielded from personal liability
under DGCL § 102(b)(7)’s exculpatory provisions, while the officer
could be held personally liable for hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Outside of Delaware, however, seven states have resolved this
inconsistency and allowed for exculpatory protections for corporate
officers.114
III. DISCUSSION
This Section will start by discussing whether directors and officers
should be subject to the same standards of liability and will opine about
if, and to what extent, the business judgment rule should apply to officers.
Then, this Section will comment on whether officers should receive any
exculpatory protections for their wrongdoings.
A. The Business Judgment Rule
1. Policy Rationales Applied to Officers
As discussed above, directors of corporations are held to a gross
negligence standard, while officers, as agents of the corporation, have
historically been held liable for simple negligence.115 Some commentators
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693,752 (Del. Ch. 2005).
Id.
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 696,709 n.37 (Del. 2009).
Follett, supra note 26.
Johnson & Millon, supra note 36, at 1639.
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argue that directors and officers should be treated the same for liability
purposes and be given the benefit of the business judgment rule because
the rationale for the rule applies equally to officer decisions.116 Others
conclude that because of the officers’ proximity to the day-to-day
workings of the corporation, and since corporate scandals are typically
perpetrated by officers rather than directors, officers should be subjected
to higher standards of liability. 117 Commentators that support the latter
argument contend that imposing an ordinary negligence standard of
conduct without the benefit of the business judgment rule is proper.118
To determine whether the business judgment rule should be applied to
officers, a starting point is to look at the policy rationales surrounding the
presumption. The reasoning in support of the presumption’s applications
to directors is to protect business decisions that were made diligently and
carefully, and not fraudulently, illegally, or in bad faith. 119 One scholar,
arguing that the business judgment rule should not apply to officers, stated
that the business judgment rule is supported by three general policy
rationales: (1) encouraging director risk-taking measures, (2) avoiding
judicial encroachment into business decisions, and (3) ensuring the
board’s role as the central decision-maker of the corporation.120 This
Section will discuss this scholar’s policy rationales, weighing whether the
rationales’ application to corporate directors would similarly apply to
officers.
i. Encouragement of Director Risk-Taking Measures
Like directors, executive officers may hold very little portions of the
corporation’s stock compared to the total stock issued and have
diversified portfolios themselves.121 As such, officers, like directors, are
unlikely to reap the total upside potential that comes from their risk-taking
measures, even if they are given a pay raise. Arguably, while officers
might be more prone to making risky business decisions because a larger
portion of their income is incentivized, in many cases officers choose to
“play it safe” to protect their jobs.122 If the corporation performs badly,
officers have more on the line–including potentially their entire career–
than directors, whose income tends to be more stable. In addition, officers

116. See Graf, supra note 6.
117. See Johnson, supra note 74.
118. Id.
119. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 8.
120. Johnson, supra note 74.
121. Id.
122. Id. A CEO's compensation "is variable in nature, in the sense that they only benefit if their
company meets or exceeds prescribed targets." Id.
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face more severe intra-firm sanctions by way of being agents of the
corporation. Before the corporation has even suffered, if the board or
shareholders finds their actions ill-advised, they may remove officers
from their position immediately.
ii. Avoidance of Judicial Encroachment into Business Decisions
Hindsight vision is 20/20.This applies to decisions made by both
officers and directors. Like directors, officers make reasoned decisions
they believe to be in the best interests of the corporation given the
information they have at the time. With any decision, when given a
second look at some point in the future, a chosen course of action may
turn out to not have been the most prudent. While some argue that officers
have more information than directors, an officer’s access to information
is not absolute, and decision-making can be burdened by time constraints
and additional stresses in times of corporate crisis.123 In addition, directors
have the same authority within the corporation to gain access to
information as officers, so a difference in decision-making scrutiny by
way of informational access is not persuasive.124 Officers should be
afforded the same protections as directors when making tough calls.
Courts are not in a position to second-guess an officer’s decision-making
tactics because doing so would be a second-guessing of the decision itself,
which courts cannot, in good faith, attempt to do given a court’s limited
information about each corporation in the context of litigation.
The most basic argument in favor of treating directors and officers the
same in terms of liability is that because they have identical fiduciary
duties, as determined in Gantler, the consequences for breaches of those
duties should be identical as well. 125 However, the argument that officers
should be held to a simple negligence standard, while valiant, fails in a
real-world application. If officers were held to a standard of simple
negligence, they could be held liable for activities that frequently occur
in the regular course of business.126 In transactions that occur all the time
in corporate America, it is not justifiable or equitable for courts to hold
well-intending officers liable for monetary damages for going about in
the regular course of business. Holding officers to such stringent
standards can cause officers to face “decision paralysis” in the midst of
complex transactional decisions they make every day that require
immediate, well-reasoned solutions.127 The frequency with which
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Graf, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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business decisions are made, which later turn out to be unwise, is not
evidence of officer misconduct so much as it shows the inherent risk of
business.
Allowing officers to benefit from the business judgment rule will not
destroy accountability. The purpose of the business judgment rule is not
to excuse officers from the duty to exercise due care in their decisionmaking processes.128 Rather, its aim is to prohibit the retrospective use of
a business decision’s poor outcome to conclude that care was not
exercised.129 Just as with directors, officers have informal sanctions
within the corporation—like termination and pay decreases—that will
hold them accountable for their wrong actions. At the end of the day, as
noted in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., it is the markets and
shareholders that should be a reflection of the decisions that officers make
every day, not the courts.130
iii. Ensuring the Board’s Role as the Central Decision-Maker of the
Corporation
Affording officers the presumption of the business judgment rule still
preserves the corporate governance scheme that the DGCL drafters
envisioned.131 However, one may argue that sheltering an officer's
conduct from judicial review by using the business judgment rule
undermines a board's decision to hold its agent to the relevant standard.132
For example, if an officer was charged with breaching a duty of care in
their decision-making, a court could use the business judgment rule to
shield the officer from liability even against the boards wishes to hold the
officer accountable. Allowing courts to defer to officer decisions against
the wishes of the board is a shortfall of applying the business judgment
rule to officers. But it is worrisome to think that officers could be held to
higher standards of liability than the ultimate managers of the corporation,
its board of directors.133 Shielding the board members with the business
judgment rule while subjecting officers to a higher standard of liability is
inconsistent with the corporate governance scheme envisioned by the
DGCL. True managers of the corporation should be subject to the same—
if not higher—thresholds of liability as their agents. Given the large

128. Johnson, supra note 74.
129. Id. The author of this article conceded this even though he did not support the proposition that
the business judgment rule should be applied to officers.
130. 907 A.2d 693, 698. 907 (Del. Ch. 2005).
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). (the business and affairs of every corporation should
be managed by the board of directors).
132. Johnson, supra note 74.
133. Graf, supra note 6.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 5

2021]

YOU’RE THE PROBLEM, OFFICER

727

number of CEOs who contemporaneously serve as chairman of the
corporation’s board of directors, it is also troubling to think that these
individuals can be held to different standards of liability based entirely on
the position they hold.
2. Other Considerations Given Case Law, Legislative Precedent, and an
Expansion of Officer’s Scope
Compelling judicial authority indicates that jurisdictions support the
application of the business judgment rule to officer decisions.134 A large
majority of corporations incorporate in Delaware based on the freedom
Delaware law provides a company to manage its affairs internally, with
minimal interference from the courts. 135 Such freedom, as vital to
corporations as it is, must be considered when determining the scope of
officer liability. Delaware, the weightiest state in regards to corporate
governance, has taken the stance that officers should enjoy the business
judgment presumption as recently as in 2018.136 In addition, various
model rules indicate that directors and officers should be routinely held
to the same standards of liability. 137 While not completely settled, if a
Delaware court were to take up this issue, it should find that the business
judgment rule applies to decisions made by officers and that they should
be held to a standard of gross negligence, just as directors are.
Recent corporate scandals seen in the news should not be a factor in
deciding whether officers should be afforded the business judgment rule’s
presumptions. Due to the mainstream media, executive officers already
have more checks than ever before on what they do on a day-to-day basis.
Today, when officers commit misdeeds, people will quickly hear about it
in great detail. This suggests that the rate of corporate officers committing
misdeeds has not increased, but that the general public hears about these
scandals more by way of social media and news sites. There are bad
apples in every profession. The fact that the public knows more about
corporate officer misdeeds than ever before should stay out of the
equation in determining whether officers deserve the benefit of the
business judgment rule.
If recent scandals perpetrated by corporate officers can be a factor in
determining whether officers deserve the benefit of the business judgment
134. See, e.g., In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 737 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2016);
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907
A.2d at 777 n.588; Stanziale v. Nachtomi (In re Tower Air, Inc.), 416 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005); In re
Xura, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12698-VCS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 563, at *27 n.113 (Ch. Dec. 10,
2018).
135. About Delaware’s Corporation Law, supra note 10.
136. In re Xura, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 563, at *27 n.113.
137. E.g., KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 8.
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rule, CEOs’ activism and extended scope into other areas must also come
into the formula. Many CEOs of leading corporations in the United States
have expressed their desire to serve all of their corporations’ stakeholders,
rather than merely shareholders.138 The newly released Statement on the
Purpose of a Corporation shows these CEOs’ commitments to better
themselves and to work on the way they are portrayed in their
communities. 139While the signatory CEOs do not nearly represent all of
the corporations in the country, many of the top corporations in the world
are represented.; Thus, the statement is a step in the right direction that
other CEOs and executives will surely follow.140 Even if, to take the
cynical view, the rise in CEO activism is just an effort to appease
millennials, more officers are starting to take notice of the effect of
philanthropic measures on corporations’ bottom lines. Officers will
continue to clean up their acts because they know the markets are
watching.
B. Exculpatory Provisions
Given that the rationale of the DGCL § 102(b)(7) is to encourage
directors to undertake risky business strategies so long as they do so in
good faith, exculpatory protections should also be permitted to
officers.141 As afforded to directors, the exculpatory protections do not
merely issue a free pass for board members to do as they please. Likewise,
these protections, if they are applied to officers, would not shield officers
from any decisions deemed to be made in bad faith or breaches of
fiduciary duties, which generally is what a court would be most likely to
find has occurred in the recent corporate scandals. Exculpatory
protections are merely other tools to protect against judicial secondguessing into the decision-making of corporate officers. Allowing
officers to receive the benefit of exculpatory protections will encourage
officers to make value-maximizing, yet potentially risky, decisions.
In addition to encouraging officer risk-taking when they otherwise may
be inclined to “play it safe,” exculpatory provisions should be afforded to
officers because the current DGCL provision allows for inconsistent
punishment of officers and directors who misbehave equally. Without
officers receiving the benefit of exculpatory provisions, they are being
severely punished monetarily for their misdeeds, while directors virtually
get off scot-free, even if they committed the same act in good faith. The
138. Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 53.
139. Id.
140. See
Our
Commitment,
BUS.
ROUNDTABLE,
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
141. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 752 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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inconsistency must be resolved by officers receiving access to
exculpation.
As critics predicted after the Van Gorkom decision, Delaware
corporations will likely continue to lose qualified individuals to serve as
officers if those individuals are not afforded exculpatory provisions.
When faced with hard calls on business decisions, officers may
instinctively try to put the blame on others, rather than take accountability
themselves, out of fear of being held personally liable for a wrong
decision. This blame-shifting can cause turmoil to the inner-workings of
a corporation. It could change the officer’s focus to drumming up methods
of avoiding responsibility for their decisions if they turn out badly. If the
goal is to obtain talented and honest agents of the corporation, officers
should be protected from decisions that in hindsight could prove to be
imprudent. Policy rationales and inconsistencies in punishment under the
current law dictate that the current DGCL provision should be amended.
As seven other states have already done, the Delaware legislature should
enact a provision that uniformly allows for the exculpation of a
corporation’s directors and officers in their by-laws.142
IV. CONCLUSION
It is justifiable to be skeptical of executive officers, given recent
outrageous corporate scandals. Officers that partake in criminal activity
deserve to be punished to the highest extent possible. However, while
there have been numerous scandals perpetrated by corporate officers in
the news today, the fact remains unclear whether officers have become
increasingly more conniving, or if corporate scandals are merely
receiving more attention as a reflection of the around-the-clock news
media. Regardless, recent corporate scandals should not come into the
equation in determining the application of the business judgment rule and
exculpatory protections to executive officers.
The dearth of case law surrounding executive officer liability is
alarming and should be resolved by officers receiving the business
judgment presumption and exculpatory protections. Policy rationales
behind the business judgment rule support its application to officers. In
addition, the most current case law and model legislation favor officers
and directors being held to the same standards of liability. Executive
officers continue to take steps to clean up their acts and create long-term
value in the political and social arenas—places traditionally outside of a
corporation’s scope. Officers should also be afforded exculpatory
provisions within a corporation’s by-laws. Without exculpatory

142. Follett, supra note 26.
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provisions, corporations will continue to miss out on talented individuals
who fear being held personally liable for mere negligent acts that occur
in the regular course of business. Exculpatory protections should be
offered to officers in order to show Delaware’s deference and confidence
in officer’s good faith decision-making.
The cure for officer malfeasance should not be worse than the disease
itself. 143 Allowing courts to intervene on the business decisions of
corporate officers but not their director counterparts may be theoretically
sound, but in practice may work to undermine the inner-workings of a
corporation. Unless grossly negligent, officers should be afforded wide
deference to their decisions, just as directors are. Courts should only
interfere with a corporation’s internal affairs when prompted to by
breaches of fiduciary duties, and leave the hindsight judgment and simple
negligence issues to be handled by the corporation internally,
shareholders, and the market.

143. Graf, supra note 6.
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